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Abstract: Children are affected by poverty more often than adults, and growing up in 
poverty has severe and long-lasting negative consequences for a child’s well-being. How-
ever, children are also in a very weak position, both to escape poverty on their own and to 
publicly and politically enforce their claims to a better life. Accordingly, children living in 
poverty are victims of two intersecting forms of powerlessness: they are children and they 
are poor. In this article, we analyze this particular type of powerlessness from a children’s 
rights perspective and argue that, in order to effectively restore justice to children in pov-
erty, the State has to implement a comprehensive children’s rights regime. We argue that 
the State is obliged to consider children’s best interests in all its policies – even those that 
are not directly related to children – in order to compensate for the lack of political agency 
during childhood. This demand reflects the particular social and political status of children, 
namely: that they are dependent on others for their well-being, that childhood is a phase of 
particular vulnerability and that (young) children lack certain competencies that are needed 
to enforce their claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Children face different types of discrimination due to different causes: they can be 
victims of sexism, xenophobia, etc. Needless to say, in many cases different types 
of powerlessness overlap in some areas. Despite the importance of these other 
forms of social injustices – and despite the vulnerability associated with them –, 
this article focuses on two main aspects of children’s powerlessness that affect the 
effective realization of their rights, namely the powerlessness in relation to the na-
ture of childhood and the powerlessness related to living in poverty or being at risk 
of social exclusion.  
Without dismissing the global nature of child poverty, its prevalence in af-
fluent societies should not be forgotten. The intersecting economic and sovereign 
debt crises of the last years have particularly favored an increase of child poverty in 
the European Union and the USA, where, as it is well-known, around 20 per cent 
of the children live in poor households (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
2012). 
Beyond these figures, the main aim of this article is to discuss how the 
State, as the main agent of justice for children, could protect children’s rights and 
in particular the rights of children living in poverty. Our analysis is not restricted to 
any particular country, but the measure we will defend, a so-called “preferential 
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option for (poor) children”, is more likely to be brought to reality in affluent states 
that already count with a well-established welfare system. 
Likewise, as a preliminary clarification, we would like to point out that, alt-
hough childhood is a fuzzy and to a large extent socially constructed concept that 
refers to human beings from zero to 18 years old, we will focus especially on young 
children and preadolescents and the states’ obligations to ensure children’s rights, 
using the capability approach as a normative framework. Therefore, this article 
does not discuss specific policies, but rather aims to offer criteria on how states 
should construct these policies to avoid the injustices generated by the double 
powerlessness suffered by children in poverty. 
 
 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
 
In this section, our aim is to argue in favor of the role of the capability approach as 
a fruitful normative framework for children’s rights if it is adapted in a way that 
reflects the particular nature of childhood. In this sense, we want to make two 
points: (1) each and every child is entitled to rights that protect their well-being and 
well-becoming and (2) the core of these rights can be expressed through central 
functionings or capabilities that depend on the maturity of the child. 
The normative core of children’s rights is slightly different from that of 
adults due to the lack of children’s full competencies concerning autonomy. While 
human rights stress that each and every person is free and entitled to rights that 
protect their freedom, it is clear and also recognized in most children’s rights con-
ventions that children are not as autonomous as adults (Stoecklin & Bonvin, 2014). 
This is certainly true for younger children who obviously lack the competencies to 
make decisions for themselves or to execute them to the same extent as adults. 
They are heavily dependent on adults to survive, to develop in healthy ways and to 
flourish. Accordingly, younger children are not granted some of the most basic 
human rights, such as moving freely, working or marrying. In contrast, we grant 
adults, in particular parents, the right to make a wide set of decisions for children 
and to shape their lives in many different ways.  
In this regard, a children’s rights agenda cannot put much normative weight 
on the current freedom of (young) children, but should also look for other norma-
tive concepts from which it can derive certain rights, as we will defend in what 
follows. 
In the most influential formulation of children’s rights, the UN Convention 
(UN, 1989), this normative background is provided by the concept of children’s 
best interests, which needs to be taken into consideration in every decision that is 
made for children. To our understanding, this best interest can be interpreted as 
the child’s well-being and well-becoming, both understood not merely as subjective 
but objective concepts (Graf & Schweiger, 2015; Bagattini & Macleod, 2014). It is 
evident that both the dimension of the actual well-being of children and the di-
mension of their development into adulthood –their well-becoming– are equally 
important. Children are developing beings and childhood is the most influential 
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and crucial phase of development in life. It would be inappropriate to deny that 
children are special in this regard and different from adults. We can all grow-up 
only once and distortions or damages in combination with the impact of the expe-
riences we make during this crucial phase can often not be repaired in later life – at 
the very least, it requires a high amount of avoidable material and personal costs to 
do so. The experiences made during childhood certainly shape our life as well as 
the options available to us as adults. 
Such an orientation towards children’s well-being and well-becoming needs 
to be defined more specifically, otherwise it is impossible to derive particular rights 
from it. According to the capability approach of Martha Nussbaum in its tradition-
al form that was developed for adults, such a definition can be expressed through a 
list of central human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011). While we agree that such a list 
is of importance, we believe that we need to make some amendments and changes.  
On the one hand, we need to acknowledge the need to start with function-
ings for children, meaning actually realized capabilities, and not merely capabilities 
(Dixon & Nussbaum, 2012). A capability is an opportunity or freedom to do or be 
something. If I have the capability to eat and live healthy, this means that, if I wish 
to, I could consciously buy healthy food, but if for whatever reasons I do not wish 
to live healthy, I simply do not. For young children this freedom is not plausible as 
a matter of justice. Firstly, they depend on the eating habits of their parents. Sec-
ondly, we cannot give young children the opportunity to decide if they wish to live 
healthy, because they are usually not competent enough to make that decision. In 
consequence, we are looking for what is necessary to make sure that young chil-
dren actually are healthy, using the dimension of well-becoming to provide them 
with what they need to live healthily as children and in later life, so that they do not 
develop chronic illnesses or lack vaccines that could protect them from future 
harm (Cabezas, Graf, & Schweiger, 2014).  
That being said, and paradoxically, implementing functionings during the 
first years of life would increase the child’s chances, over her development, to ex-
press her views and needs, to participate in the processes that affect directly her 
life, and, eventually, to give the child an active role regarding the implementation 
of their rights back. In this sense, although the capability approach is mainly a the-
ory built around the concept of freedom, and given the fact that it was mainly de-
signed for adult agents of rights  –as many traditional theories of justice do, choos-
ing capabilities instead of functionings when it comes to young children would 
turn out to be negligent and an instance of injustice–.  
In fact, children are also in the process of developing the necessary compe-
tencies to make autonomous decisions, so that when they have these competen-
cies, if they are mature enough, we should also enable them to make decisions for 
themselves –at least to a certain extent, depending on their level of maturity (Ar-
chard & Skivenes, 2009)–.  
This means that we should allow them to have capabilities, which is the 
first important change we need to make: children’s rights are to be expressed in the 
form of functionings as long as children are not competent enough to make au-
tonomous decisions. Only if they are mature should they be given capabilities.  
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On the other hand, we need to provide concrete criteria in order to identify 
the functionings/capabilities that matter for children’s well-being and well-becoming 
in a way that they could and should be transformed into children’s rights. 
We suggest four such criteria in what follows:  
 
1. The chosen functionings/capabilities should reflect the best available 
empirical knowledge about children’s lives and development, in particular their 
physical, mental and social needs. This also means that the function-
ings/capabilities may change and can be redefined if new knowledge is available. 
Today, for instance, we have information on how children develop and on how 
their development is shaped by their environment, as well as on the various inter-
connections between childhood and adulthood, like the influence of growing up 
poor on the bodily, cognitive and emotional development.  
2. Secondly, the chosen functionings/capabilities must be, at least partly, 
amenable to influence by society. This means that it can be guaranteed that chil-
dren are actually granted these rights.  
3. Closely connected to this second criterion, the chosen function-
ings/capabilities should be objectively determinable and not merely subjective, at 
least to some degree. This means that they should not primarily depend on the 
assessments, experiences and evaluations of the subjects in question. This is im-
portant because children’s rights should also guide the behavior of institutions and 
the design of policies, which requires the well-being of different children to be 
comparable and the ways in which it can be influenced and changed to be objec-
tively comprehensible.  
4. The chosen functionings/capabilities should incorporate a developmen-
tal perspective. Such “evolving functionings/capabilities” reflect the “process 
character” of the child’s development (Ballet, Biggeri, & Comim, 2011). 
 
A list of central functionings/capabilities that is selected according to these 
criteria does not aim for completeness, but will have to be constantly discussed, 
refined and revised. Furthermore, the implementation of children’s rights accord-
ing to these central functionings/capabilities in a concrete social context will al-
ways have to take other aspects into consideration as well. Such other aspects in-
clude the level of economic development, cultural traditions –only if they do not 
violate any child’s rights– and the justified and feasible rights of other parties. 
Nonetheless, children’s rights provide the State and other important agents con-
cerned with the well-being and well-becoming of children with a guide and a first 
concept of justice for children. These rights should never be violated and chil-
dren’s central functionings/capabilities should be granted to each and every child 
for the very fact that they ensure and describe their well-being and well-becoming. 
To put it differently: children should possess all of the rights needed to ensure that 
they can actually execute those functionings/capabilities. In this sense, the capabil-
ity approach, when adapted to children, can become a very successful framework 
to translate human rights into less abstracts measures of social justice. 
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THE DOUBLE POWERLESSNESS OF CHILDREN LIVING IN POVERTY 
 
Children are powerless in at least four important ways: they are physically, socially, 
economically and politically powerless. Once again, it is important to note that 
these features have a developmental dimension, which means that as children 
grow-up and expand their repertoire of competencies, they become more and 
more powerful. The differences between children of different ages are therefore 
considerable and we cannot reflect them here properly. Likewise, these four types 
of powerlessness reflect aspects of both the nature of childhood and the way insti-
tutions approach and see them. That is, these four traits are, to varying degrees, the 
result of the role that a given conceptualization of childhood gives children as citi-
zens based on some of their features. 
 
1. The physical powerlessness of children lies in their increased vulnerabil-
ity and their lack of completely developed physical and mental competencies. Es-
pecially young children are unable to protect themselves against external harm, like 
being hit by an adult or being left alone in the cold and rain. There are two reasons 
for that: the first is their physical and psychological immaturity, the second their 
lack of experiences and knowledge. This limits the ability to make decisions that 
take the main available options into account, simply because this counterfactual 
exercise is often too abstract, especially during the first years of life. They depend 
on the care of adults to grow-up, to develop healthily and to flourish.  
2. The social powerlessness of children lies in their comparatively low so-
cial status in relation to adults. Furthermore, cultural and social habits render chil-
dren incompetent and in need to be controlled. As we previously said, paternalism 
towards children may be justified and is needed in many situations. In fact, treating 
young children in non-paternalistic ways would often result in negligence. Howev-
er, this also implies an asymmetrical scenario where children are not treated as 
equal citizens. 
3. The economic powerlessness of children lies in their lack of economic 
rights and competencies. In contrast to adults, they do not own private properties, 
and they are denied the right to work and manage their own financial status. This 
makes them once again especially dependent and vulnerable to the adult’s context 
they interact with – an interaction they have not chosen. Even if they have some 
form of income from sporadic jobs, a grant, a subsidy or a family heritage, their 
savings will always be administrated by an adult. Likewise, they depend on the eco-
nomic power that their caregivers may have, which has certain consequences on 
their well-being and their options in life. 
4. The roots of children’s political powerlessness are even more diverse. 
They lack the right to vote and cannot be elected as political representatives. Simi-
larly, they do not claim their own rights and therefore their recognition and visibil-
ity as worthy citizens depends on other adults and public institutions’ will. Addi-
tionally, children do not gather or organize in visible pressure groups or lobbies in 
the same ways adult civil society does. In combination with the previously men-
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tioned lack of the right to vote, this turns their opinions, desires, problems and 
needs into unheard claims. While a group of discriminate adults can eventually 
gather, organize and create social nets to support each other in the process of leav-
ing an abusive situation behind or in gaining recognition, children depend on citi-
zens with more power to change whatever unfair situation they may find them-
selves in.  
 
At same time, as a vicious circle, the still present collective imaginary on 
childhood and children as passive social agents and citizens is at the base of many 
instances of children’s powerlessness in the public arena, which does not contrib-
ute to any kind of breakage or solution to these types of powerlessness, especially 
the social and political ones. 
The implementation of a framework that is able to represent children as 
valid agents and participants in the processes affecting their own life, despite the 
fact that children are the most vulnerable members of private family and social 
networks, will therefore depend on the social and political will and, as a result, will 
have to deal with two obstacles. Firstly, it would have to overcome the conceptual-
ization of children as passive beings. Being a developing person does not mean 
that the child is passive, lack opinions or has no interests for her own life. Second-
ly, it would have to make an effort to adapt processes and channels of communica-
tion to make them more in line with the features and skills that that group of citi-
zens (young children, pre-adolescences, and adolescences) possesses so that they 
could effectively participate and contribute to the measures and debates affecting 
their own well-being. 
Needless to say, these four types of powerlessness affect children qua chil-
dren and they increase their vulnerability to suffer from instances of injustice 
(Mullin, 2013): they are placed in an asymmetric interpersonal dynamic where they 
can easily be harmed. A very obvious example of this interconnection between 
powerlessness and vulnerability is the case of child sexual abuse. Physical power-
lessness combined with certain circumstances may easily turn into vulnerability, 
resulting in exploitation and sexual abuse. While sexual exploitation of children is 
not necessarily always connected to poverty, it is often the result of a history of 
domestic neglect and violence, which leads to cases of running away and leaving 
the household –and sometimes, children are even sold by their own families–. In 
such cases, prostitution is a way out to survive for them (ECPAT International, 
2014). Here, the combination of their lack of autonomy and their physical, social 
and economic powerlessness results in extreme forms of vulnerability. 
One might think that children are not more vulnerable than any other dis-
criminated group. However, childhood is a crucial phase as it is the moment where 
we are provided with the basic tools to lead our life. Likewise, the instances of 
damage during this developmental phase will filter future experiences jeopardizing 
so many of the person’s chances. The first years of life modulate indeed how the 
child perceives herself, how she interacts with the others, and what she thinks she 
deserves and can achieve. In this sense, the experiences lived during childhood 
acquire a normative role.  
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In cases where children grow-up and live in disadvantaged circumstances, 
i.e. when they and their parents are poor and socially excluded, this powerlessness 
is increased and intensified by a second type of powerlessness, which we want to 
call “deprivation induced powerlessness”. This form of powerlessness has two 
dimensions: firstly, the inability of children to escape their poverty and to shield 
themselves from the negative effects of poverty; secondly, the inability of their 
parents or other care-givers to protect them from poverty. Poor parents cannot 
adequately substitute the powerlessness of their children in the aforementioned 
four dimensions. Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the parents or other guardians are 
expected to care for their children in a way that their rights are respected and real-
ized. However, under conditions of deprivation, like income poverty, unemploy-
ment, lack of education or low social status, parents are themselves powerless, 
which leads to a lack of the agency that is necessary to provide children with the 
measures needed for their wellbeing and well-becoming. 
This “deprivation induced powerlessness” is particularly problematic in 
light of the increasing knowledge about the negative consequences of growing up 
and living in poverty. It leads to a deprivation in different central function-
ings/capabilities, such as being healthy, educated, included, sheltered or well nour-
ished (Eamon, 2001; Evans & Kim, 2013; Ferguson, Bovaird, & Mueller, 2007). 
These effects of poverty start very early on and are transmitted through different 
social channels. Child poverty is hence a violation of the rights of these children 
and must be regarded as unjust (Schweiger & Graf, 2015). On the one hand, chil-
dren can neither be held responsible for being poor nor do they have the compe-
tencies or abilities to escape poverty on their own. On the other hand, child pov-
erty is a structural problem that is produced and perpetuated through the social 
and economic system. Because of their powerlessness, they are trapped in their 
deprived situation and have to live with the consequences and reduced life chances. 
 
 
THE STATES’ DUTIES TOWARD CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
 
In this section we argue that the powerlessness of children in general and the dou-
ble powerlessness of children living in poverty demands comprehensive measures 
from the State, especially in regard to children’s ability to protect their rights and to 
claim what they believe they are entitled to. One measure that seems particularly 
feasible and reasonable is to make sure that the State implements what can be 
called a “preferential option for (poor) children”. Acting upon that, the State 
would have to consider children’s rights and, accordingly, their well-being and well-
becoming in all of its policies, even in those that are not directly concerned with 
children but are likely to have influence in them in some ways. 
However, what we propose is not a measure of positive discrimination, as 
it was used for approaching the problem of gender biases. The lack of power in 
childhood is not only related to social values as it appears to be in the case of gen-
der discrimination, but also to the very nature of childhood as a developmental 
phase. Especially when it comes to young children, they do not primarily lack au-
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tonomy because society denies them to be autonomous – even though children are 
victims of many different forms of oppression –, but because they are developing 
those skills. In this sense, our proposal cannot be limited to a temporary measure 
until the situation is rebalanced, but it has to be committed to protect the basic 
needs and rights of a group of especially vulnerable citizens.  
The State is certainly not the only “agent of justice” (O’Neill, 2001) that has 
an obligation to protect children’s rights, but it is a particular important one, espe-
cially for children growing up and living in poverty. The UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (1989) recognizes this obligation: “States Parties shall undertake all ap-
propriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of 
the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social 
and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum 
extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international co-operation” (Art. 4). 
The State’s obligation is grounded in at least four reasons:  
 
1. The State is powerful and has many resources that it can use to improve 
the situation of children and to protect their rights. It can set up institutions like 
the education, welfare and health system, and it can authorize laws that protect 
children. The State is also a ‘second-level agent of justice’, meaning that it can hold 
responsible other important agents like parents, care-givers, social welfare institu-
tions or companies by enforcing their obligations towards children and by sanc-
tioning the violation of children’s rights. It is worth noting that this power of the 
state may be significantly reduced in cases of developing countries, where transna-
tional institutions like the World Bank or the UN are often more powerful.  
2. The State is neutral and has to protect all children equally, while parents 
have good reasons to be biased. The family is certainly important, but not only are 
the resources of most families limited in regard to what they can achieve for their 
children, let alone other children, but the close attachment between parents and 
their own children also makes them less likely to intervene for other children’s 
rights when their realization will reduce the chances of their own children.  
3. The State is also bound by the interests of children as future political 
agents. Even though children lack political agency as long as they are children, al-
most every child will eventually become an adult. As Elizabeth Anderson (Ander-
son, 2010) has argued, the State has an obligation to allow all children to grow-up 
in a way that they allows them to become political agents – an entitlement that is 
included in the children’s rights to well-becoming. Furthermore, adults who grew 
up under circumstances that violated their own rights have good reasons to hold 
the State and the political system responsible for that, and they may even demand 
retribution for gross negligence.  
4. The State has an interest in realizing justice cost-effectively. This means 
that it uses its funds so that the best possible results are achieved for everyone. In 
the case of children, early interventions are cost-effective because the realization of 
children’s rights and their well-being and well-becoming significantly decreases 
costs in the future. Take the example of health: if a child’s right to health is pro-
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tected and the child grows-up healthily, this decreases the likelihood of illnesses 
and health problems in later life. Being healthy is also a precondition for economic 
participation and performance. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: REFLECTING THE RIGHTS OF (POOR) CHILDREN IN POLICY MAKING 
 
How can the State live up to the expectations as an agent of justice for children? 
To phrase it differently: how can it implement and protect children’s rights, espe-
cially those of disadvantaged children, effectively? We want to propose, as a sug-
gestion for future debate, the idea of a preferential option for (poor) children. Such 
an option demands that the State considers children’s rights in all of its policies, 
not only in those that are directly concerned with children, and that it does it in a 
way that treats children’s well-being and well-becoming as priorities. This does not 
automatically imply that parental rights and the well-being of parents are not im-
portant or should simply be sacrificed for the greater good of their children. In this 
article we are agnostic towards the relationship between particular children’s and 
parental rights and accordingly also to the question whether or not children’s rights 
are best supported and protected if parents have more far reaching rights or 
whether these rights should be restricted. What seems important, however, is that 
the family, the child-parent relationship and the care that parents or other guardi-
ans invest, is of utmost important for the children’s well-being and well-becoming, 
and that the State has an interest in supporting parents and guardians in that re-
spect to be good caregivers (Archard, 2010). Anne Alstott has called this the obli-
gations of the State and the society towards parents that follows from their respon-
sibility to provide constant care (Alstott, 2004). 
The idea of such a preferential option for (poor) children would include 
five main lines of work:  
 
a) The explicit acknowledgement of children’s rights and their importance 
for all policy areas where children could eventually be involved in or where they 
could be affected by blindness to their needs. While polices are at first sight often 
directly aimed at adults, they may eventually expand to children’s affairs. Such in-
stances need to be regarded as an injustice and a terrible ethical myopia, since not 
every person affected by such measures is taken into consideration in the process.  
b) The inclusion of children in political decision making by appointing 
deputies that speak for them, by the consultation of experts from various disci-
plines (health, social work, psychology etc.), but also by listening to children’s voic-
es and their own thoughts as soon as they are competent enough (Lansdown, 
2001). Currently, we have enough means available to make children’s voices audi-
ble. Ignoring the potential victims/beneficiaries, at least as a source of information, 
should be considered a non-justified bias. Children and adolescents affected by 
poverty count with a sense of justice, are able to actively participate in a dialogue 
about their own situation as well as are able to provide solutions and suggestions to 
improve an unfair given context (Pitillas and Gómez, 2014). In this sense, children 
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are therefore able to execute their rights when the proper channels of communica-
tion are provided. 
 c) The design and implementation of a nation-wide plan to protect all chil-
dren’s rights and to improve their situation, especially of disadvantaged children, as 
well as the proper funding of measures that are needed to do that. This plan can 
also acknowledge priority areas, like health and education, as well as priority target 
groups, such as homeless children or children of minorities. Again, ignoring that 
children in this particular situation suffer a multi-dimensional victimization would 
result in context-blind policies.  
d) A proofing of all policies and laws regarding their impact on children, 
and in particular on poor children. This requires every newly designed and imple-
mented policy to be checked on the effects it may have on children and on wheth-
er or not it may violate children’s rights or contribute to their realization. This idea 
of a mandatory proofing process can be found in other areas like the health impact 
assessment (Kemm, 2013).  
e) Finally, the training of all of the State’s employees who are in contact 
with children in order to detect and report violations of children’s rights. They 
should also be provided with the necessary means to act in their positions. 
 
Poor children’s vulnerability and powerlessness translate into a set of 
threats affecting different areas of their well-being and well-becoming that should 
not be ignored: children may be neglected in a material and emotional way, they 
may lack the attention they need to properly develop, and they may find their 
chances to flourish considerably reduced as a consequence of avoidable circum-
stances. For this reason, the suggested preferential option for (poor) children may 
at least try to accommodate for the lack of political agency children have, and also 
for the fact that poor children are in a position of double powerlessness and in 
particular need of the State to protect their rights. These criteria can finally help to 
filter and detect unnoticed injustices, just like they can help to scrutinize the moral 
validity of political proposals.  
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